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The paper assesses the communication strategies of the Federal Reserve, the 
Bank of England and the European Central Bank and their effectiveness. We find 
that the effectiveness of communication is not independent from the decision-
making process in the committee. The paper shows that the Federal Reserve has 
been pursuing a rather individualistic communication strategy amid a collegial 
approach to decision-making, while the Bank of England is using a collegial 
communication strategy and highly individualistic decision-making. The ECB 
has chosen a collegial approach both in its communication and in its decision-
making. Assessing these strategies, we find that predictability of policy decisions 
and the responsiveness of financial markets to communication are equally good 
for the Federal Reserve and the ECB. This suggests that there may not be a 
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The move of many central banks over the past decade towards greater transparency as well as 
decision-making by committees has implied that communication through individual 
committee members has become increasingly relevant. How should individual members 
communicate? And what role should their personal views play in a central bank’s overall 
communication strategy? 
  The objective of this paper is to analyse the communication strategies in the context 
of their underlying decision-making processes, and to assess their effectiveness for three of 
the world’s major central banks: the Federal Reserve – since its adoption of a more 
transparent disclosure practice in May 1999, the Bank of England – since its independence in 
May 1997, and the European Central Bank (ECB) – since January 1999. We focus on two 
central questions. First, do communication strategies regarding future monetary policy 
decisions and decision-making processes in these three central banks differ and how? Second, 
we assess the effectiveness of communication by asking whether it enables financial markets 
to better anticipate monetary policy decisions and helps central banks in moving asset prices 
in the desired direction. 
  A central argument of the paper is that it is important to distinguish between what 
committee members say, i.e. how they communicate, from what they actually do, i.e. how 
they vote on monetary policy decisions. Analysing the statements by all committee members 
in the inter-meeting periods (speeches, interviews, testimonies, etc.), we find that the Federal 
Reserve is pursuing an individualistic communication strategy as there is a high degree of 
dispersion in what the individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
say. In contrast, decisions in the FOMC are generally made in a highly collegial manner, 
which usually implies a unanimous vote on monetary policy. A different approach has been 
adopted by the Bank of England, which has been following a more collegial communication 
strategy with a significantly higher degree of consistency among the statements of the 
committee members. At the same time, however, decision-making in the Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC) is highly individualistic as the majority of the decisions has not been 
unanimous. Finally, the members of the ECB’s Governing Council follow a highly collegial 
approach to communication as well as decision-making, and inter-meeting communication 
moreover shows the highest degree of consistency with future policy decisions as compared 
to the MPC and in particular the FOMC. 
  In the second part of our analysis, we ask how these differences in strategies impact 
the effectiveness of communication. We argue that a collegial approach to communication 
and decision-making as practiced by the ECB should lead to highly predictable policy 
decisions, and should imply that markets react to statements by all policy-makers in the same 
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but voting consensual, should make a central bank predictable if markets are able to figure out 
whose statements to watch closely. In this case, one would expect that communication by 
some policy-makers is relatively more influential than that of their peers. Finally, we argue 
that an approach as followed by the Bank of England, where communication is collegial yet 
voting is highly dispersed, runs the risk of being less predictable, and might imply that 
financial markets do not react to communication as strongly as for the other central banks.  
  In the empirical analysis, we find support for our hypothesis that the predictability 
of policy decisions is highest for the FOMC and the Governing Council, and lower for the 
MPC. Also the reaction of financial markets to communication essentially confirms our 
hypotheses. US markets react significantly stronger to statements by Chairman Greenspan 
and less to statements by other FOMC members, whereas euro area markets respond to 
communication by the ECB President and other Governing Council members to a very similar 
extent. 
  We conclude that the approaches to communication by the Federal Reserve and by 
the ECB have proven to be equally successful in their effectiveness, despite having pursued 
very different strategies, suggesting that there may not be a single best approach to designing 
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“…[T]he willingness of FOMC members to present their individual perspectives in 
speeches and other public forums provides the public with useful information about 
the diversity of views and the balance of opinion on the Committee.”                                          
B. Bernanke (2004) 
 
“What matters for transparency is therefore clarity as well as openness. For a new 
and supranational institution like the ECB, it is particularly important that it sends 
clear and coherent messages to the markets and the wider public. … Speaking with 
one voice – or at least speaking ‘one language’ – is of particular importance for 
transparency and clarity in the case of the Eurosystem.”                                                          
O. Issing (1999, pp. 508-09) 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The recent past has witnessed a paradigm change in the way central banks around the world conduct 
monetary policy. This paradigm change has implied not only a change in the strategy pursued by 
central banks, but also in how central banks have implemented their respective strategies. Along 
with a trend towards greater independence, there has been a move towards decision-making by 
committees rather than individuals, as well as a strong emphasis on central bank transparency.  
There is a broad consensus, that, beyond its role in making a central bank accountable, transparency 
may help enhance the effectiveness of policy (Blinder 1998, Woodford 2003). However, the central 
bank is faced with a potential conflict, as a maximum level of transparency need not be optimal for 
the efficiency with which it is able to pursue its mandate. Such a conflict may occur when giving 
more information induces not more but less clarity and common understanding among market 
participants, as there are limits to how much information can be digested effectively (Kahnemann 
2003). Moreover, too much information may crowd out the formation of private beliefs which are a 
crucial source of information for a central bank, and thus for the effectiveness of policy making 
(Amato, Morris and Shin 2002). As such, transparency is not an end in itself but merely a means to 
help the authority achieve its mandate (Issing 1999, Mishkin 2004). 
The move towards decision-making by committees has also implied that communication through 
the individual committee members has become increasingly relevant. How should individual 
members communicate? And what role should their personal views play in a central bank’s overall 
communication strategy? As argued by Bernanke in the above quote, it may be desirable to 
communicate the diversity of the views in the committee, or, as argued by Issing, the central bank 
might think that this may risk inhibiting clarity and common understanding. In the first instance, a 
more individualistic approach to communication is preferable, whereas in the second case, a central 
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bank may opt for a more collegial approach. Moreover, the communication strategies by central 
banks are not independent of the underlying decision-making process of the committee. Decisions 
may be made in a highly collegial manner, or they take place in an individualistic way that allows 
and encourages individual members to vote in accordance with their personal views (Blinder 2004, 
Blinder and Wyplosz 2004). In turn, the effectiveness of communication and therefore the choice of 
a communication strategy may be highly dependent on the nature of the decision-making process. 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the communication strategies in the context of their 
underlying decision-making processes, and to assess their effectiveness for three of the world’s 
major central banks: the Federal Reserve – since its adoption of a more transparent disclosure 
practice in May 1999, the Bank of England – since its independence in May 1997, and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) – since January 1999. We focus on two central questions. First, do 
communication  strategies regarding future monetary policy decisions and decision-making 
processes in these three central banks differ and how? Second, we assess the effectiveness of 
communication by asking whether it enables financial markets to better anticipate monetary policy 
decisions and helps central banks in moving asset prices in the intended way. 
A central argument of the paper is that it is important to distinguish between what committee 
members  say, i.e. how they communicate, from what they actually do, i.e. how they vote on 
monetary policy decisions. We analyse the statements by all committee members in the inter-
meeting periods (speeches, interviews, testimonies, etc.), as reported by the newswire service 
Reuters. The reason for choosing a newswire service, rather than central bank reports, for measuring 
communication is our objective of analysing communication from a market perspective, i.e. to look 
at those statements that actually become available to market participants.
1 
We find that the Federal Reserve is pursuing an individualistic communication strategy as there is a 
high degree of dispersion in what the individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) say. In contrast, decisions in the FOMC are generally made in a highly collegial manner, 
which usually implies a unanimous vote on monetary policy. A different approach has been adopted 
by the Bank of England, which has been following a more collegial communication strategy with a 
significantly higher degree of consistency among the statements of the committee members. At the 
same time, however, decision-making in the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is highly 
individualistic as the majority of the decisions have not been unanimous. Finally, the members of 
                                                           
1 Four caveats of the methodology should be emphasised. First, newswire services are selective in their 
reporting, thus not covering all statements made by all the relevant committee members, although the large 
majority of statements are indeed reported. However, as we are interested partly in testing the market response 
to communication, it makes sense to focus only on those statements that actually reach market participants, 
and this is best achieved by looking at a prominent newswire services. Second, newswire services may 
wrongly report or misinterpret a statement by policy makers. Third, communication may have an undesired 
effect on markets, whether it is correctly or incorrectly reported. Again, our objective is to assess 
communication from the perspective of financial markets and therefore we analyse the information market 
participants actually receive. And fourth, many different pieces of news hit and influence financial markets 
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the ECB’s Governing Council follow a highly collegial approach to communication as well as to 
decision-making. Inter-meeting communication moreover shows the highest degree of consistency 
with future policy decisions as compared to the MPC and in particular the FOMC. 
In the second part of our analysis we ask how these differences in strategies impact the effectiveness 
of communication. We argue that a collegial approach to communication and decision-making as 
practiced by the ECB will lead to highly predictable policy decisions, and will imply that markets 
react to statements by all policy-makers in a similar way. An approach as followed by the Federal 
Reserve, where communication is dispersed but voting consensual, will make a central bank 
predictable if markets are able to figure out whose statements to watch closely. In this case, one 
would expect that communication by some policy-makers is relatively more influential than that of 
their peers. Finally, we argue that an approach as followed by the Bank of England, where 
communication is collegial yet voting is highly dispersed, runs the risk of being less predictable, 
and might imply that financial markets do not react to communication as strongly as for the other 
central banks.  
In the empirical analysis, we find support for our hypothesis that the predictability of policy 
decisions is highest for the FOMC and the Governing Council, and lower for the MPC. Also the 
reaction of financial markets to communication essentially confirms our hypotheses. US markets 
react significantly stronger to statements by Chairman Greenspan and less to statements by other 
FOMC members, whereas euro area markets respond to communication by the ECB President and 
other Governing Council members to a similar extent. We conclude that the approaches to 
communication by the Federal Reserve and by the ECB have proven to be equally successful in 
their effectiveness, despite having pursued very different strategies, suggesting that there may not 
be a single best approach to designing a central bank communication and decision-making strategy. 
The paper starts by reviewing the literature on central bank communication and decision-making in 
section 2. Section 3 then discusses our data source. The communication strategies and decision-
making processes of the three central banks are analysed and compared in section 4. This is 
followed by an empirical analysis of the effectiveness of central bank communication in influencing 
asset prices in the desired way in section 5. Conclusions and policy implications follow in section 6. 
 
2.  Literature on central bank communication and decision-making 
The academic and policy literature on central bank communication stresses the seminal role of 
communication for the effectiveness of monetary policy (Bernanke 2004, Blinder 1998, Buiter 
1999, Issing 2005, King 1997).
2 Blinder (1998) and Bernanke (2004) emphasise that monetary 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
every day. To ensure that we are measuring the effect of communication, rather than others news, we control 
for the release of important macroeconomic news. 
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policy has in many countries only a single direct tool, namely the overnight interest rate, such that 
monetary authorities can exert only an indirect effect on those asset prices that are of key 
importance for the economy, such as long-term interest rates, equity prices and exchange rates. 
Communication therefore provides an important means for central banks to influence these asset 
prices, but it requires credibility and a strong track record for authorities to do so. 
Much of the academic literature focuses on the theoretical aspects of transparency and 
communication, frequently building on the influential work by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986).
3 The 
definition of what constitutes transparency is not always straightforward. Although it generally is 
understood to mean the absence of asymmetric information between markets and policy makers, 
there are different elements to transparency including clarity, openness, honesty and common 
understanding (Winkler 2000). A key issue in this literature is whether and under what conditions 
transparency improves economic efficiency. LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Geraats (2002) show that 
communication may be undesirable if it is of poor quality or sufficiently noisy so as to raise market 
volatility. 
A second strand of the literature focuses on the extent to which communication can substitute policy 
action. In principle, a monetary authority that is sufficiently credible may be able to influence asset 
prices by communicating its views about its intended level and by signalling its intention to move 
policy if asset prices deviate from this target. This issue has sparked a debate about the time 
consistency of such “open mouth operations”, which implies that authorities may have an incentive 
to give incorrect information to the markets and thus that communication can be fully credible and 
effective only if it is followed by policy action. Much of the work in this area has focused on 
strategic monetary policy games, building on the work by Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and 
Gordon (1983) and Walsh (1998). For instance, Goodfriend (1986) and Stein (1989) argue that one 
solution to this trade-off between maintaining credibility while conducting an effective 
communication policy is to provide imprecise announcements about its views and information, i.e. 
by providing less than full transparency. 
A third strand of the literature has emerged more recently that shows how transparency may alter 
the balance of the information exchange between the monetary authority and the markets in the 
opposite direction of what the second strand implies, namely by inducing a sub-optimal behaviour 
by financial markets. Morris and Shin (2002), Amato, Morris and Shin (2002) and Padoa-Schioppa 
(2004) argue that communication by central banks may become too dominant by crowding out the 
formulation of independent beliefs by the private sector based on the information that it has a 
comparative advantage in gathering. Transparency and communication may thus be undesirable to 
the extent that it eliminates or at least reduces an important source of information for the central 
                                                           
3 Geraats (2002) and Carpenter (2004) provide a detailed review in particular of the theoretical work on 
transparency and communication. 
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bank, namely the market perspective as a distinct source of information, which plays an important 
role for monetary policy making. 
Concerning empirical work on central bank communication, the literature is still quite small, partly 
reflecting the difficulty of measuring it and partly due to the relatively recent adoption of 
transparency as a major characteristic of central bank policy. Guthrie and Wright (2000) find that 
communication has been used in a systematic and highly effective way for controlling short-term 
rates by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. For the United States, Kohn and Sack (2003) show that 
statements by FOMC Chairman Greenspan about the monetary policy inclination have a significant 
effect on the volatility of short-term interest rates while statements about the economic outlook tend 
to have a significant impact on longer maturities. Demiralp and Jorda (2004) provide related 
evidence by showing that it is mainly the public announcements by the Fed that move short-term 
interest rates, rather than the liquidity channel of open market operations. For the ECB, Gerlach 
(2004) analyses the content of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin in terms of inflation, economic activity 
and money, and whether these are consistent with monetary policy decisions. Finally, Bernanke, 
Reinhart and Sack (2004) and Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2004) find that US markets attribute 
considerable importance to statements that include an indication about the future path of policy. 
Haldane and Read (2000) provide evidence that the effect of monetary policy decisions on short-
term interest rates in the United Kingdom has decreased over time, which may suggest that 
information asymmetries about the economy have been reduced. Andersson, Dillen and Sellin 
(2001) for Swedish Riksbank and Siklos and Bohl (2003) for the Bundesbank before 1999 also find 
that communication of these two central banks has indeed played some role in influencing financial 
markets. The latter show that Bundesbank communication is more strongly related to financial 
market movements if these statements are about interest rates as compared to the exchange rate. 
Jansen and de Haan (2004) look at the ECB in 1999-2002 and argue that statements among the 
individual members of the Governing Council about interest rates and about inflation exhibited 
some degree of contradiction, though this has decreased over time. 
Finally, there has been some empirical work on the role of central bank communication in different 
contexts. Jansen and de Haan (2005) for the ECB and Fratzscher (2004) for the G3 monetary 
authorities analyse the effect of communication on exchange rates. While the former finds some 
effect on the volatility of the euro, the latter finds more systematic evidence in favour of 
effectiveness for all three G3 central banks in changing the level and volatility in the desired 
direction. A different strand of the empirical literature analyses the predictability of monetary policy 
decisions (Artus and Wyplosz 2002, Kuttner 2001, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2003, 2004, Lange, 
Sack and Whitesell 2003, Perez-Quiros and Sicilia 2002), although in a companion paper we do not 
find that the change in the Federal Reserve’s disclosure practice in May 1999 has improved the 
ability of markets to predict monetary policy decisions (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2005). 
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The literature on the role and constitution of the policy-setting committee and institutional factors 
governing the decision-making process is still rather limited. A broad consensus has emerged that 
delegating the monetary policy decision to an independent committee of individuals leads to a 
superior policy for a number of possible reasons, such as the ability to pool judgments of different 
individuals (Blinder and Morgan 2000), ability to learn from other members (Lombardelli, 
Proudman and Talbot 2002) or the increased flexibility that committees show in responding to 
shocks of different magnitudes (Sibert 2003, Mihov and Sibert 2004). However, the literature is still 
in its infancy, as many issues such as those related to the role of strategic voting, the uncertain 
incentives of individuals to acquire and reveal private information, possibly conflicting preferences 
and communication among members make it hard to provide a conclusive recommendation of the 
role, size and constitution of committees (e.g. Gerling, Grüner, Kiel and Schulte 2003). Whether 
central bank committees should publish the votes of the individual members is a debated issue (e.g. 
Buiter 1999, Issing 1999). For the case of the ECB, Cukierman (2001) sees a danger that published 
votes might lead the national media to unduly discuss the voting behaviour of the governors of the 
National Central Banks (NCBs) from a national perspective. As the US Federal Reserve has a long-
established policy-making committee, most empirical analyses are focusing on the FOMC. A 
thorough study of its decision-making is provided in Chappell et al. (2004). A related paper to ours 
is the recent work by Blinder and Wyplosz (2004), which also compares the decision-making 
processes of the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, and 
recommends how committee structures should relate to communication policies. We will come back 
to their work further below. 
 
3.  Measuring communication  
We first turn to the issue of how to measure communication. We want to obtain all statements 
related to monetary policy by the individual committee members in the inter-meeting period. For 
the policy makers, we include the FOMC’s 19 members, comprising the seven governors of the 
Board of Governors and the 12 presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks. We do not make a 
distinction between voting member and non-voting members as all 19 members participate in the 
FOMC meetings.
4 For the MPC, we cover the governor, the other four internal members and the 
four external members, who are appointed directly by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. For the 
Governing Council of the ECB, we cover the 6 Executive Board members, including the President, 
and the 12 governors of the NCBs of the Eurosystem. 
                                                           
4 The 12 voting members of the FOMC comprise the seven governors and five of the 12 presidents of the 
Federal Reserve Banks. The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has a permanent vote, the 
presidents of the Chicago and Cleveland branches alternate annually while the other nine presidents rotate on 
a three-year basis. 
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An additional element of communication strategies is the statements of the committees as a whole, 
in particular those that are released on monetary policy meeting days. All three central banks release 
press statements immediately after their decisions. However, the press statements are very different 
as the Federal Reserve provides a short summary of the decision plus a balance-of-risks assessment 
over the foreseeable future while the Bank of England only occasionally offers an additional 
explanation to its decision. Neither of the two holds a press conference on the meeting day, whereas 
both provide additional information at a later stage through publications of minutes. By contrast, the 
ECB provides a press release as well as a press conference after the first Governing Council 
meeting each month (during which monetary policy decisions are discussed), including an extensive 
Q&A session, to explain its decision. Although it may be interesting to analyse the type of 
communication that is released by the committee as a whole, we refrain from doing this here as the 
focus of this paper is on the structure and strategies of committees and their impact and 
effectiveness.
5 
As for the time period, we use daily data for all data series and begin the analysis in May 1999 for 
the Federal Reserve, as it then underwent significant changes in its disclosure practices and 
transparency. We chose the period since May 1997 for the Bank of England as at that point it was 
granted independence, and January 1999 for the ECB for the start of its conduct of monetary policy. 
Having determined the policy makers and respective time periods, we use a commonly used 
newswire service, Reuters News, to extract all reports about forward-looking policy statements, 
which can be three types of communication - speeches, interviews or testimonies, on a daily basis. 
We distinguish between two types of statements, one referring to the monetary policy inclination, 
and the second one to the economic outlook. Clearly, one can think of different and finer categories 
of communication, such as e.g. distinguishing also between statements about inflation versus 
monetary aggregates. However, we decided to keep the categorisation as simple as possible, 
following the terminology also used by Kohn and Sack (2003). The search commands we employed 
are the name of the policy maker together with the terms interest rates, inflation or monetary policy 
for the first type of statements, and together with economy or economic outlook for the second type 
to extract all relevant statements. 
The objective is to obtain all statements in real time, i.e. on the day and time when they occur in 
order to be able to test whether these statements influence financial markets. In particular, we very 
carefully chose only the first report in Reuters News, which usually comes within minutes of each 
statement and is mostly descriptive without providing much analysis or interpretation, and discard 
                                                           
5 Moreover, we ensured in our analysis that no relevant communication by the committee as a whole occurred 
on the same day as statements by individual committee members, so that the econometric results for the 
committee members presented below are robust to excluding communications by the whole committee. To 
this end, we deleted any statement that occurred on meeting days of the decision-making bodies of all three 
central banks, as well as on the publication days of the Monthly Bulletin and the Annual Report for the ECB, 
of the Inflation Report and the MPC minutes for the Bank of England, and of the FOMC minutes and the 
beige book for the Federal Reserve. 
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all subsequent reports or analysis of the same statement. Furthermore, as much as possible, we 
targeted only forward-looking statements, as opposed to statements that aim to explain to the 
markets the most recent decision that had been taken at the time. This allows us to prevent 
duplication as well as to avoid including reports that occur sometimes with a delay of some days.  
The final step consists of classifying the inter-meeting statements into those that give an inclination 
of tighter monetary policy versus no change or lower interest rates (C
MP),












































The classification of statements is often referred to as content analysis, describing the systematic 
technique for analyzing the content of a message (Holsti 1969). An important point to stress is that 
this classification is based on our own judgment and reading of the newswire reports and thus does 
not rule out a wrong classification in individual cases. In line with the work in content analysis, we 
tried to reduce the chance of misclassification by having two persons analyse critical statements 
independently. In those cases where we were unsure about the classification of the statement, we 
double-checked subsequent reports about the same statement and classified them accordingly or 
discarded them. In the appendix we provide a few examples of Reuters reports along with our 
classification. 
Four additional caveats of the methodology should be emphasised. First, newswire services are 
selective in their reporting, thus not covering all statements made by all the relevant committee 
members, although the large majority of statements are indeed reported. However, as we are 
interested partly in testing the market response to communication, it makes sense to focus only on 
those statements that actually reach market participants, and this is best achieved by looking at a 
prominent newswire services. Second, newswire services may wrongly report or misinterpret a 
statement by policy makers. Third, communication may have an undesired effect on markets, 
whether it is correctly or incorrectly reported. Again, our objective is to assess communication from 
the perspective of financial markets and therefore we analyse the information market participants 
actually receive. And fourth, many different pieces of news hit and influence financial markets 
                                                           
6 A similar methodology for the classification of monetary policy statements is used by Guthrie and Wright 
(2000) for New Zealand. 
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every day. To ensure that we are measuring the effect of communication, rather than others news, 
we control for the release of important macroeconomic news. 
 
4.    Strategies of communication and decision-making 
4.1  Communication in the inter-meeting period 
Our first objective is to understand and compare the communication strategies by the three central 
banks. By “communication strategy” we mean and focus on three aspects: first, the content – what 
is being communicated and by whom – second, the timing – whether there is a systematic pattern to 
when communication occurs, in particular with regard to meetings and monetary policy changes – 
and third, the consistency – whether the content of the communication among the different members 
of the committee are consistent with one another and with monetary policy decisions. 
 
4.1.1 Content 
Who talks and what is being said in the inter-meeting period? Table 1 provides an overview of all 
statements extracted from Reuters News using the approach discussed above. Some interesting 
stylised facts emerge from this overview. 
First, there are many statements that are neutral about the monetary policy inclination, and this is in 
particular so for members of the Governing Council of the ECB. In fact, a very often reported 
language of Governing Council members refers to interest rates and monetary policy in the euro 
area as being “appropriate”, or what we label “neutral” in Table 1. Overall, 142 or 62% of all ECB 
statements about monetary policy were neutral. By contrast, FOMC members seem to be more 
inclined to provide a view of changes in monetary policy. Only 46 or 28% of the statements by 
FOMC members were neutral, while 41% of statements by MPC members about monetary policy 
inclination were neutral. Moreover, relatively more biased statements are towards easing than 
tightening, which makes sense as interest rates went down for most of the sample period. 
Second, communication about the economic outlook mostly indicates an improvement, with hardly 
any statements indicating no change. This may seem somewhat at odds with the facts of booming 
economies till 2000, a sharp slowdown thereafter and a modest recovery since 2003. However, the 
results make sense considering that a statement indicating no change in the economic outlook may 
contain little news – whereas a neutral statement about monetary policy does – and therefore policy 
makers may refrain from making such statements. 
 
 
Third, the head of each central bank generally communicates more than other committee members. 
This is the case in particular for the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, but less so for the 
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ECB. What is also striking about the statements of the heads of the three central banks is that they 
make relatively fewer neutral statements than other members. This may be interpreted as the heads 
leading the communication strategy in indicating the committee’s views on monetary policy and its 
changes. Moreover, there is again a difference across the different central banks as this point applies 
in particular to the Federal Reserve, and much less so for the ECB, with the Bank of England 
ranging in between. 
Fourth, there is a difference in the way different groups of committee members communicate. For 
the Federal Reserve and the ECB, members who do not reside directly at the headquarters, i.e. the 
regional Federal Reserve presidents and the NCB governors, provide a larger number of statements 
than the governors of the Federal Reserve Board and the Executive Board members of the ECB 
(excluding the head), which reflects the fact that the first group is significantly larger than the 
second. However, an interesting difference is that the first group of members seem to provide biased 
statements, i.e. indicating tightening or easing of monetary policy, relatively more often. 
In sum, these stylised facts offer some striking differences in the communication of the three central 
banks. We investigate in detail below whether this finding is explained by the different paths in 
monetary policy or rather reflects differences in communication strategies. 
 
Is there are purposeful strategy behind the timing of communication? One objective of 
communication is to prepare markets of upcoming policy decisions. It may therefore be possible 
that policy makers intensify communication prior to meetings, or at least to meetings in which a 
change is envisaged to be likely or expected by the markets. Alternatively, some observers have 
argued that policy makers may agree to communicate less just before meetings in order not to raise 
market uncertainty. 
Figures 1.a – 1.c provide an overview of the distribution of statements about the monetary policy 
inclination and the economic outlook over the whole period of 1999-2004 or 1997-2004. The 
figures underline some of the points stressed above about the content of the communication, but 
they also show some marked differences in the direction and frequency of communication across 
different sub-periods. In particular, the statements about monetary policy are largely consistent with 
the direction of the monetary policy rate and communication intensifies in periods of change. 
Specifically the years 2001 and 2002 stand out, underlining the significant changes in monetary 
policy and the economic outlook taking place during those two years. 
 
 
Focusing in more detail on the timing of communication around monetary policy meetings, Figures 
2.a – 2.c show the distribution of statements on the days before and after the policy meetings of the 
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4.1.2 Timing  
three authorities. There is one striking similarity across all central banks: in the days immediately 
prior to the monetary policy meetings, there is a considerably smaller amount of communication 
compared to other days.
7 Furthermore, the intensity of communication is different before meetings 
than after meetings for all three central banks. With the exception of the days surrounding the 
monetary policy meetings, there is generally a higher level of activity before than after meetings, 
stressing the attempt of central banks to prepare markets for the upcoming meeting.  
 
 
A formal test of the hypothesis that central banks intensify communication prior to meetings in 
which a change is envisaged to be likely is provided in table 2. For each central bank, the table 
compares the frequency of communication in the inter-meeting periods that precede meetings with 
and without interest rate changes. The frequency is calculated as the share of days in which 
communication takes place. It turns out that the difference is statistically significant for the Federal 
Reserve at the 99% level, and for the Bank of England at the 90% level. Both central banks do 
indeed intensify communication prior to meetings in which interest rates are changed. This is not 
the case for the ECB, however, which has virtually identical frequencies for both occasions. 
 
 
As the final step in the analysis of the communication strategy of the three central banks, we turn to 
the issue of consistency: are the statements of the individual committee members consistent with 
each other and with monetary policy decisions? Looking at this issue may allow us to obtain a better 
understanding on whether there are differences in the way the role of communication is understood 
and defined by the three authorities. 
We use a simple statistical dispersion measure to assess the consistency of communication in the 
period between meetings for each of the central banks. This dispersion for a particular inter-meeting 
period k is defined as the sum of the distance between each of the statements in the inter-meeting 























                                                 (1) 
                                                           
7 Unsurprisingly, as all central banks respect a black-out period prior to meeting days during which committee 
members refrain from giving interviews, etc. That our database records statements in the days prior to 
meetings is mainly related to other types of communication, like - in the case of the ECB - the hearings before 
the European Parliament. 
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4.1.3 Consistency  
 
with C
MP defined as a [-1,0,+1] variable, as outlined above, N the total number of statements in the 
inter-meeting period k, and D a dummy that takes the value of one if N is an odd number and zero if 
it is even.
8 The total dispersion measure Ω over all inter-meeting periods is the defined as the 











1                                                              (2) 
 
The dispersion measure for communication about the economic outlook is defined analogously.
9 
Figures 3.a – 3.c show the distribution of the dispersion measures over time, distinguishing between 
monetary policy inclination in the upper panel and the economic outlook in the lower one. The 
figures show dispersion in communication throughout the period, though for many cases there is an 
increase in dispersion in 2001 and 2002, when there were relatively many monetary policy changes 
and an increased degree of uncertainty about the prospects of the three economies. 
 
 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the average dispersion for each of the central banks and gives test results 
for whether there are statistically significant differences in dispersion across central banks. 
Dispersion of communication about monetary policy for the Federal Reserve is 0.32, and 
significantly lower at 0.13 for the Bank of England and 0.15 for the ECB. This result is important as 
it suggests that communication about monetary policy among the members of the FOMC is less co-
ordinated and may pursue a different objective from that of the members of the Governing Council 
and the Monetary Policy Committee. The result may also partly reflect the fewer statements by and 
fewer members of the MPC, and the fact that the ECB and the Bank of England have more frequent 
policy meetings.
10 
                                                           
8 The reason for changing the weighting for the periods with an odd number of statements is that the last 
observation in the odd-numbered case may provide no additional information about the degree of dispersion. 
As an example, take the case of two statements – one being neutral and one indicating a tightening bias – 
which yields a distance measure of Ωk = (1-0) / 0.5 * 2
2 = 0.5. If there is a third statement it should not alter 
the degree of dispersion whether it is neutral or has a tightening bias. Hence, the dispersion measure in either 
case also yields Ωk = [(1-0)+(1-0)] / 0.5 * (3
2 -1) = 0.5, which is achieved by adjusting the denominator. 
9 The dispersion measure is also used by Jansen and de Haan (2004), who use different communication data 
and focus only on the ECB and Bundesbank officials in 1999-2002. 
10 Scheduled FOMC meetings occur eight times, or about every six weeks, whereas MPC meetings and 
Governing Council meetings at which monetary policy is discussed usually take place once a month. Before 
November 2001, monetary policy was discussed in each of the bi-weekly meetings of the ECB Governing 
Council. As a longer inter-meeting period means that more information becomes available and hence the 
monetary policy inclination and economic outlook is more likely to change, part of the higher dispersion may 
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The role that the number of committee members may play in determining the degree of dispersion is 
addressed in panel B of Table 3. This table shows the degree of dispersion in communication among 
a single committee member, namely the head of each central bank. The results show a very low 
degree of dispersion for each of the heads. Overall, what this underlines is that the degree of 
dispersion presented in panel A of Table 3 reflects the dispersion across committee members. We 
also interpret this evidence as supporting the quality of our communications data as one would 
indeed expect a low degree of dispersion for individual members. 
 
 
Taking a different perspective, a complementary way of assessing the consistency of 
communication is to ask whether statements are consistent with the decision taken in the next 
meeting or in future meetings. Panel A of Table 4 shows the share of all statements that is consistent 
with the next monetary policy decision. The key finding is that 68% of all statements about the 
monetary policy inclination of Governing Council members are consistent with the decision at the 
next meeting, whereas only 56% of statements of FOMC members shows such consistency. This 
difference proves statistically highly significant. The Bank of England takes an intermediate 
position with 59%, which is not significantly different from the shares of the ECB or the Federal 
Reserve. If the statements were to signal future decisions, their consistency should be higher than 
50%. This is indeed the case for the ECB (at the 99% level) and the Bank of England (at the 95% 
level), but not for the Federal Reserve. 
One reason for the relatively low degree of consistency of FOMC communication may lie in the 
fact that the horizon of statements may go beyond the next meeting. In fact, much of the 
communication of the Federal Reserve in 2003 and 2004 has been stressing the medium-term 
outlook for monetary policy. Panel B of Table 4 presents the consistency of communication with 
the  direction of monetary policy. The results reveal that indeed a much larger share of the 
communication for all central banks is consistent with the direction. For all three central banks, our 
consistency measures are statistically different from 50% at the 99% level. Nevertheless, the 
consistency of statements by Governing Council members is still higher than that for the Federal 
Reserve or the Bank of England, although this difference is not statistically significant any longer. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
be explained by these different lengths. Testing this hypothesis by using four-week windows for all central 
banks shows that the differences in the dispersion measures indeed become smaller and less significant. 
However, as this four-week period included two policy meetings for the ECB prior to November 2001, such a 
test introduces a bias in the results towards raising dispersion of ECB communication. 
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In sum, we conclude that communication exhibits significant differences in the degree of dispersion 
and of consistency across the three central banks. Overall, for the Federal Reserve, communication 
appears to follow a more individualistic approach, aiming at providing the public with the diversity 
of views among FOMC members. By contrast, communication strategies follow a more collegial 
approach, intending to mainly convey the committee view and consensus among members for the 
MPC and in particular for the Governing Council. 
 
4.2  Decision-making process 
In order to analyse and assess the inter-meeting communication of committee members it is crucial 
to understand the nature of the decision-making process at the committee meetings, as the 
effectiveness of such communication is likely to be determined in a central way by whether the 
communication strategy translates into a similar pattern in the voting on monetary policy decisions. 
The minutes of the FOMC and the MPC provide the voting behaviour of all individual committee 
members. In contrast, the ECB does not publish how a decision was made, and it has signalled 
frequently that it is made in a collegial manner.  
Looking at the voting pattern in the central banks shows some striking differences. For the FOMC, 
there were 7 out of a total of 44 meetings (or 15.9%) between May 1999 and May 2004 in which the 
decision was not unanimous – and in each but one case there was only one dissenting vote.
11 By 
contrast, the MPC shows a remarkably high degree of dispersion in voting since independence in 
May 1997. In more than half of the MPC meetings, or 46 out of 85 meetings (54.1%) did at least 
one MPC member dissent with the decision. The average number of dissenters was about two – out 
of a maximum possible number of dissenters of 4 in the nine-person MPC – and in as many as 6 
meetings was the decision made with a majority of only a single vote – i.e. 5 votes in favour versus 
4 votes against. On two occasions, in February and March 1998, there was a tie as 4 members voted 
in favour of a tightening while 4 voted to keep rates unchanged.
12 
Overall, this shows a remarkable degree of dispersion for the MPC and underlines its strong 
individualistic approach to decision-making. By contrast, decisions are taken in a collegial manner 
in the FOMC and the Governing Council. 
 
5.    Effectiveness of communication 
We now turn to the question of whether the described differences in communication strategies 
across the three central banks has led to differences in the effectiveness of communication as a tool 
                                                           
11 Obviously, even in the case of unanimous decisions, some committee members might have expressed 
deviating views before voting (Meade, 2004).  
12 The voting records of the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve are in the public domain and are 
released with the minutes two weeks and three weeks, respectively, after each meeting. Note that the number 
of members in the MPC has been increased since independence and reached its current size of nine members 
only in June 1998. 
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of monetary policy. We define effectiveness as containing two elements: first, the ability of 
financial markets to predict future monetary policy decisions; and second, the ability of policy-
makers to influence financial markets by moving asset prices. Clearly, these two elements are not 
independent of each other as communication that leads to high predictability of decisions may also 
have a significant effect on financial markets. Moreover, it should be stressed that these two are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for successful and effective communication as 
communication policy should also aim at anchoring and guiding market expectations over the 
medium- to long-run (Issing 2005, King 2004). Furthermore, it is also clear that the three central 
banks operate in very different economies. For example, the United Kingdom is relatively more 
open and thus more affected by exchange rate movements than the US and the euro area.
13 Such 
differences could affect the uncertainty under which the central banks operate, and as such the 
predictability of decisions.  
Before conducting the analysis on effectiveness, we summarise the results so far and formulate the 
hypotheses concerning monetary policy effectiveness in the following way: 
 
communication communication voting predict- market
dispersion consistency with dispersion ability responsiveness
policy decisions
Federal Reserve high medium low ? high
only to some members
Bank of England low medium high medium medium
uniform to all members
European Central Bank low high none high high




This table, in a nutshell, summarises in a very stylised fashion the different communication 
strategies, based on our analysis above, by the three central banks. The question is: what do these 
strategies imply for the effectiveness of communication? In principle, one would expect that more 
dispersion in communication and in voting, as well as lower consistency with monetary policy 
decisions, should reduce predictability and lower the responsiveness of markets to communication. 
However, markets may nevertheless react significantly to statements by some individuals if they 
expect that this individual’s view reflects the majority view or at least is powerful enough to sway 
the majority on his or her point of view. Hence the communication strategy of the Federal Reserve 
may indeed induce high predictability and markets respond strongly, despite a high degree of 
communication dispersion, if markets are able to figure out whose statements to watch closely to. 
As committee structures generally give a strong weight to the chairman, we will test whether 
financial markets respond more strongly to his communication. As pointed out by Chappell et al. 
                                                           
13 As a matter of fact, several of the statements by MPC members in our database stress the importance of 
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(2004) and Meyer (1998), when it comes to the policy decision and voting Chairman Greenspan 
generally speaks first, presents his policy proposal and then asks the FOMC members for their vote. 
For most meetings analysed by Cappell et al., the majority of voting members agreed with his 
position. 
For the Bank of England, the medium consistency with decisions and the high voting dispersion 
may imply that the inter-meeting statements are not a very good indicator for future decisions. 
Unless this is compensated for by other information, we would expect only a medium level of 
predictability. In the case that MPC members convey dispersed views in the inter-meeting period, it 
is furthermore not entirely clear whether financial markets should watch predominantly 
communication by the Bank of England’s Governor. Although the Governor has a casting vote in 
the event of a tie, his role in the meetings of the MPC is very different from Chairman Greenspan’s 
in the FOMC, as is clear from see the description of the MPC meeting structure in Bean and 
Jenkinson (2001): The Deputy Governor responsible for monetary policy usually speaks first, and is 
followed by the other MPC members, who normally give an indication of their policy preference. 
The Governor himself usually concludes the exchange of views, and, “once all Committee members 
have given their views, […] puts a motion that he expects will command a majority and calls for a 
vote” (Bean and Jenkinson, 2001, p.438). Overall, therefore, we would expect a relatively weak 
effect of communication on financial markets for the Bank of England. This hypothesis differs from 
that proposed by Blinder and Wyplosz (2004) who argue that from a purely theoretical perspective 
“…an individualistic MPC pursuing a highly transparent strategy may be the best arrangement for 
making monetary policy decisions… [and to] achieve the highest degree of both effectiveness and 
accountability” (p. 21), as the diversity of views should give markets the broadest possible set of 
information. However, we think that in such a setting it would be important to convey the individual 
views of the committee members to the public already ex ante, rather than only communicating 
them ex post through the publication of voting records. 
By contrast, for the ECB, communication in the inter-meeting period has low dispersion and the 
monetary policy decision is usually unanimous and consistent with the decisions.
14 One would 
therefore expect that communication is highly effective in allowing markets to correctly predict 
decisions. One would also expect that financial markets react to communication by all members as 
everyone’s statement should give an accurate indication of future decisions of the committee. 
In this section, we present measures of predictability to assess the first element of effectiveness. We 
then continue by analysing in detail how differences in communication strategies are explained and 
reflected in the diverse reactions of financial markets to the various types of communication. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
exchange rate developments for the outlook for monetary policy in the UK. 
14 In case of divergent views, the ECB president clarified “that markets have to listen more to me than to 
others” (Press conference on 8/11/2001; see http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2001/html/is011108.en.html.). 
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5.1 Predictability of monetary policy decisions 
If transparency is present and markets and policy makers have the same information, markets 
should also be able to anticipate monetary policy decisions well. This implies that the unexpected 
component of the monetary policy decision should be small on meeting days. We test this 
hypothesis and the differences across the three central banks, by analysing the size of the short-term 
interest rate change on the day of the monetary policy decisions. We follow the approach of Perez-
Quiros and Sicilia (2002) and use one-month EONIA swap rates for the euro area, and one-month 
LIBOR rates for the UK and the US.
15 Table 5 shows these results for all policy meetings in panels 
A and C and only for those meetings with policy changes in panels B and D. Panels A and B 
exclude unscheduled meetings, whereas panels C and D include them. A key result is that monetary 
policy surprises on all monetary policy meeting days are almost always statistically significantly 
higher for the Bank of England compared to the ECB and the Federal Reserve. For meetings 
including the unscheduled ones (panel C), the mean absolute surprise on the meeting day is 3.6 bp 
for the ECB, 5.6 bp for the Federal Reserve and 6.0 for the Bank of England. For those days with 
interest rate changes (panels B and D), the mean absolute surprises of the three authorities are very 
similar at around 10-12 bp when including unscheduled meetings, and somewhat lower for the 




Overall, the key finding is that the Federal Reserve and the ECB are roughly equally predictable in 
their monetary policy decisions, where the concept of predictability is based on the change of short-
term interest rates on the monetary policy meeting day. By contrast, monetary policy decisions by 
the Bank of England are somewhat less predictable.
17 The question that arises from this result is 
what prepares markets in the United States and in the euro area so that they are better able to 
anticipate policy decisions compared to the United Kingdom, and what role communication plays in 
this context. 
 
5.2 Market reaction to communication 
The second component of effectiveness of communication is the question of whether policy-makers 
are capable of influencing asset prices in the desired way. If communication is informative about 
                                                           
15 As explained in detail in Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002), one would ideally like to use overnight rates, but 
these prove highly volatile due to other factors, in particular due to changes in liquidity over the respective 
maintenance periods. 
16 The table also shows the variances of the absolute interest rate surprises on the meeting days, and confirms 
that this variance is lowest for the ECB and highest for the Federal Reserve, though the differences are not 
always statistically significant. 
17 A similar result is obtained in Moessner, Gravelle and Sinclair (2004) in a comparison of the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of England. 
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future policy decisions, and hence monetary policy decisions are highly predictable, then one would 
expect that communication has a significant impact on asset prices. However, it should be stressed 
that high predictability does not necessarily imply that it is communication which induces markets 
to correctly anticipate policy decisions. In fact, it has been argued by Bank of England Governor 
King (2000) that, for a transparent central bank, it should be the economic developments that allow 
policy decisions to be predictable, rather than communication by the authority.
18 
This subsection tests for the impact of communication on financial markets. We look at both the 
yield curve as well as at equity prices, exchange rates and inflation expectations. Interest rate data 
are US Treasury bill rates for the US, and interbank rates and government bond yields for the euro 
area and the UK.
19 Equity returns are the daily returns of the major stock market indices (the 
S&P500, FTSE100 and EUROSTOXX), and exchange rates (EUR/USD, UKP/USD) are closing 
quotes at 18.00 EST. Inflation expectations are derived from inflation-indexed five-year bonds. 
Communication may have a dual objective from a financial market perspective: it aims at 
influencing the level of asset prices as well as the degree of volatility and uncertainty. To allow 
testing both as well as to account for the interaction between the two, we model the effect of 
communication on asset price returns rt and on asset price volatility ht in a standard exponential 
GARCH (EGARCH) framework, proposed by Nelson (1991). Our EGARCH(1,1) model formulates 
the conditional mean equation for the asset price return rt as a function of the inter-meeting 
communication (C
EC, C








t t X C C r r ε δ β β λ α + + + + + = −1                      (3) 
 
The vector Xt of controls includes day-of-the-week effects, monetary policy shocks and the surprise 
component of various macroeconomic news. Our measure of monetary policy shocks is based on 
the change in short-term rates as explained in section 5.1. The surprise component of macro news is 
constructed by subtracting market expectations obtained through a survey of market participants 
(using the median expectation) from the actually released figure. We included various macro 
announcements that have been singled out as important in earlier work.
20 We enter all these 
variables to ensure that our parameters of interest β
EC and β
MP capture solely the effect of inter-
                                                           
18 King (2000) emphasises this point as follows: “A transparent monetary policy reaction function means that 
the news should be in the developments of the economy not in the announcements of decisions by the central 
bank. … Hence a successful central bank should be boring – rather like a referee whose success is judged by 
how little his or her decisions intrude into the game itself.” 
19 All results for the UK are robust to using the more liquid two front short sterling contracts traded on LIFFE. 
To maintain comparability across countries, we report results for LIBOR rates in this paper. 
20 See, e.g., Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004). The set of macro news comprises advance GDP, consumer 
confidence, CPI, industrial production, ISM survey, nonfarm payrolls, PPI, retail sales, trade balance and 
unemployment for the United States; GPD, earnings, industrial production, manufacturing production, M4, 
PPI, RPIX, retail sales, trade balance and unemployment for the UK; euro area business confidence and 
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meeting communication. We have also tested whether including the “stock” of communication 
affects the reaction of financial markets to an additional piece of communication. In this case, we 








i t C , i.e. the “stock” of 
communication over the last 10 days. The results remain virtually unchanged.  
We assume that  t t t v h ⋅ = ε , with  t v is an i.i.d. sequence with zero mean and unit variance. The 
conditional variance ht can therefore be expressed as a function of communication dummies (CD
EC, 
CD
MP), the past variance (ht-1) and innovations ( 1 − t ε ), and the controls XDt (entered as dummy 
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The EGARCH approach corrects for the kurtosis, skewness, and time-varying volatility of the asset 
price. An additional advantage of the EGARCH approach is that we do not need to impose non-
negativity constraints on the conditional second moments. The model is estimated via log-


































with µ the vector of parameters of interest and T the number of observations. (3)-(4) constitutes the 
benchmark model underlying our analysis of effectiveness. 
Table 6 shows the results for the conditional mean equation (3) and Table 7 for the conditional 
variance equation (4). The overall results are compelling. Monetary policy communication 
generally has a significant effect on the short and medium-term horizons of the yield curve. For 
Federal Reserve statements the effect is around 1 basis point on average, and is found for nearly all 
maturities between three months and 5 years. For the Bank of England, where we would have 
expected less of a reaction of financial markets, we do indeed find much smaller coefficients, 
particularly at the very short end, where it is only one half of the coefficient found for the Federal 
Reserve. Finally, for the ECB, where our hypothesis was that markets would generally react to 
communication, as it serves as a useful indicator for future monetary policy decisions, we find a 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
consumer confidence, German ifo business climate, industrial production, PPI, retail sales, trade balance, 
unemployment, CPI and GDP for the euro area. 
25
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 488
May 2005 
highly systematic pattern, in that all maturities up to 5 years are affected significantly, and the 
effects are the largest of all three central banks, ranging from 1.6 to 2.5 basis points. 
 
 
The second set of results refers to the market response to statements about the economic outlook. 
The striking finding of Table 6 is that mainly US markets react to such statements by the Federal 
Reserve, and the effects are strongest at the medium to long end of the yield curve. By contrast, 
markets do not react, or much less so, in the UK and the euro area to such communication. One 
interpretation is that these responses reflect the different monetary policy reaction functions of the 
three central banks. The strategies of the Bank of England and the ECB focus on price stability 
whereas the Federal Reserve gives a stronger weight to the real economy, and the findings of Table 
6 mirror the market perception and anticipation of these strategies. 
Third, communication also has a significant effect on other asset prices. A statement indicating a 
bias towards tightening leads to a drop in equity markets in all three economies. Inflation 
expectations are basically unaffected by communication. Moreover, the response of volatility to 
monetary policy communication is often positive, in particular in the US (Table 7).  
Finally, in order to understand whether the effects of communication on financial markets are also 
economically important, we have compared the magnitude of the coefficients in table 6 with those 
for the macroeconomic news. In order to arrive at comparable estimates, we recoded the surprise 
components into 1,0,-1 dummy variables depending on whether the surprise component on a given 
day was positive, zero or negative. We find coefficients of a similar magnitude, which generally are 
somewhat smaller for the macro surprises than for central bank communication at the short 
maturities, and somewhat larger at the longer maturities.
21 Although these coefficients are not 
strictly comparable (as, for example, our communication dummies cannot distinguish whether the 
content of the communication was expected by the markets or took them by surprise), we take this 
evidence as suggestive that both, central bank communication and macroeconomic news, affect the 
markets in a similar fashion. Overall, we conclude that communication by committee members can 
influence markets, but that its effect differs across central banks. 
 
5.3 Differences by person, type of statement and market conditions 
In trying to understand these differences in the financial market response to communication, we 
now turn to the role of individual persons or groups in the committees and the type of statements. In 
particular, what type of communication is important, and does it matter who provides this 
information? 
We modify our model accordingly and estimate 
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which is defined analogously to the benchmark model (3)-(4), only that now we distinguish between 
e.g. whether the person communicating is the head (Dt=1) or another committee member (Dt=0), as 
well as other types of asymmetries.  
Tables 8 and 9 provide the results for these tests. The first panel of Table 8 tests whether 
communication on monetary policy by Chairman Greenspan has a larger effect on financial markets 
than that by other FOMC members. We find indeed that it is mainly communication by the 
Chairman that moves markets, as communication by the other members of the FOMC does not 
affect markets significantly. For several cases, this difference in effect is statistically significant. For 
the Bank of England, we find similarly that the effect of communication on interest rates reported in 
table 6 is based on communication by Governors George and King, as communication by other 
members does not exert a significant effect on rates, and the estimated coefficients are smaller for 
the other members. Finally, for the ECB, as expected, we find that both the president and the other 
members of the Governing Council affect interest rates in a statistically significant way, with 
generally no statistically significant difference between the two. 
Looking at the differences between different groups of members mirrors the distinction found for 
the head and the other members. (second columns, Tables 8-9). Moreover, for the case of the ECB, 
statements that go against the direction of past monetary policy decisions have often a larger effect 
on financial markets than those that confirm the direction. This indicates that markets may pay 
closer attention to those statements that signal a directional change in policy. 
 
 
In summary, the differences across members and groups in the policy-setting committees constitute 
an interesting result that is overall consistent with those about the communication strategies 
presented in section 4. In section 4 we showed that the degree of dispersion in communication 
among FOMC members is significantly larger than that for the ECB’s Governing Council or the 
Bank of England’s MPC. At the same time, voting dispersion of members in the policy meetings is 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
21 Results are not reported here for brevity, but are available upon request.  
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large for the MPC. One interpretation of the findings here is that US market participants tend to 
focus on the statements of those individuals who are considered to represent the majority FOMC 
view, in particular those of the FOMC Chairman. These statements prove to be highly influential in 
financial markets. By contrast, low dispersion in communication in the euro area implies that 
markets pay equal attention to statements by all members. For the MPC, markets are found to react 
relatively less to statements, which may in part reflect the fact that communication may not yield a 
precise indicator for the voting behaviour of individual members and thus for MPC decisions. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
With the recent trend towards independent central banks, there has been a development towards 
decision-making by committees rather than individuals, as well as a strong emphasis on achieving 
greater central bank transparency. Against this background, the paper has analysed the strategies as 
well as the effectiveness of communication by the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the 
ECB. We have asked how the communication strategies in these three central banks differ, and we 
have assessed whether communication has enabled financial markets to better anticipate monetary 
policy decisions and also has helped central banks in moving asset prices in the desired way. A 
central argument of the paper is that the effectiveness of communication is not independent from the 
decision-making process in the committee. We find that it is important to distinguish between what 
committee members say, i.e. how they communicate, from what they actually do, i.e. how they vote 
on monetary policy decisions.  
The paper has shown that the Federal Reserve is following a more individualistic communication 
strategy in that there is a high degree of dispersion in what the individual FOMC members say. The 
decision-making process by the FOMC, however, is collegial in that most decisions are made 
unanimously. By contrast, the Bank of England has been pursuing a more collegial communication 
strategy but at the same time has also a highly individualistic approach to decision-making as the 
majority of MPC decisions has not been made by consensus. Finally, the approach chosen by the 
ECB is again fundamentally different by being collegial throughout both in its communication 
strategy and in its approach to decision-making. 
In the second part of the analysis, the paper turned to the question of how these differences in 
strategies impact the effectiveness of communication. We argue that a collegial approach to 
communication and decision-making as practiced by the ECB should lead to highly predictable 
policy decisions, and should imply that markets react to statements by all policy-makers in the same 
fashion. An approach as followed by the Federal Reserve, where communication is dispersed but 
voting is consensual, makes a central bank predictable if markets are able to figure out whose 
statements to watch closely. In this case, one would expect that communication by some policy-
makers is relatively more influential than that of their peers. Finally, we argue that an approach as 
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followed by the Bank of England, where communication is collegial yet voting is highly dispersed, 
runs the risk of being less predictable, and might imply that financial markets do not react to 
communication as strongly as for the other central banks. 
In our empirical analysis, we find that the predictability of policy decisions is highest for the FOMC 
and the Governing Council, and lower for the MPC. Also the reaction of financial markets to 
communication essentially confirms our hypotheses. US markets react significantly stronger to 
statements by Chairman Greenspan and less to statements by other FOMC members, whereas euro 
area markets respond to communication by the ECB President and other Governing Council 
members to a very similar extent. Moreover, US markets react to statements both about the 
monetary policy inclination and the economic outlook, whereas UK and euro area markets respond 
mostly only to communication about monetary policy, a difference that most likely reflects also the 
different market perceptions of policy reaction functions.  
Predictability and market impact of communication are necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
successful and effective communication as communication policy should also aim at anchoring and 
guiding market expectations over the medium- to long-run (Issing 2005). Moreover, it can be 
argued that with a transparent monetary policy reaction function, there is less need for central banks 
to communicate and markets may react less to statements by central banks as compared to 
macroeconomic news (King 2000). Nevertheless, the findings of this paper indicate that the 
approaches to communication by the Federal Reserve and by the ECB have proven to be equally 
successful in their effectiveness, despite having pursued very different strategies, suggesting that 
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Table 2: Frequency of communication before meetings with and without 
interest rate changes 




Federal Reserve 13.91% 9.33% ***
Bank of England 6.41% 4.75% *
European Central Bank 15.43% 15.54%
Communication frequency prior to meetings
 
Note:  ∆ denotes whether the parameters are statistically significantly different across 
columns. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels. 
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Table 3: Dispersion of communication 
 









Federal Reserve 0.32 - *** *** 0.23 - ***
   May 1999 - May 2004
Bank of England 0.13 *** - 0.03 *** - ***
   May 1997 - May 2004
European Central Bank 0.15 *** - 0.18 *** -
   January 1999 - May 2004
monetary policy direction economic outlook
 
 









Federal Reserve 0.07 - 0.03 -
   May 1999 - May 2004
Bank of England 0.04 - 0.01 -
   May 1997 - May 2004
European Central Bank 0.02 - 0.01 -
   January 1999 - May 2004
monetary policy direction economic outlook
 
 
Notes: Displayed are the average dispersion measures over all inter-meeting periods, as defined in the text. ∆
1 
shows statistic significance of difference with the Federal Reserve, ∆
2 with the Bank of England, and ∆
3 with 
the ECB. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels. 
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Table 4: Consistency of communication  
 
Panel  A:    Consistency of communication with next policy decision 








Federal Reserve 56.0% - ** 40.0% - ***
   May 1994 - May 2004
Bank of England 58.6% - 28.9% -
   May 1997 - May 2004
European Central Bank 67.5% ** - 21.2% *** -
   January 1999 - May 2004




Panel   B:   Consistency of communication with next policy change 








Federal Reserve 84.1% - 76.5% - * **
   May 1994 - May 2004
Bank of England 78.0% - 58.3% * -
   May 1997 - May 2004
European Central Bank 87.8% - 58.1% ** -
   January 1999 - May 2004
monetary policy direction economic outlook
 
 
Notes: Displayed are the consistent statements with the next monetary policy change as a share of all non-
neutral statements. ∆
1 shows statistic significance of difference with the Federal Reserve, ∆
2 with the Bank of 
England, and ∆
3 with the ECB. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels. 
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Table 5: Predictability of policy decisions 
 
 
Federal Bank of European
Reserve England Central Bank
May 1999-2004 May 1997-2004 Jan. 1999-2004
∆∆ ∆ ∗
Number of meetings 40 84 99
Mean absolute surprise at meeting 0.027 0.059 *** 0.032 ***
Variance of the absolute change 0.019 0.012 ** 0.007
Number of meetings 16 27 14
Mean absolute surprise at meeting 0.062 0.106 * 0.103
Variance of the absolute change 0.013 0.014 * 0.008
Number of meetings 43 85 100
Mean absolute surprise at meeting 0.056 0.060 0.036 **
Variance of the absolute change 0.026 0.012 *** 0.007
Number of meetings 19 28 15
Mean absolute surprise at meeting 0.121 0.107 0.121
Variance of the absolute change 0.027 0.013 ** 0.009
Panel A: all monetary policy meetings (excluding unscheduled meetings)
Panel B:  meetings with interest rate changes  (excluding unscheduled meetings)
Panel C: all monetary policy meetings (including unscheduled meetings)
Panel D: meetings with interest rate changes  (including unscheduled meetings)
 
 
Note: ∆ denotes whether the parameter in the respective column is statistically significantly different from the 
parameter for the Federal Reserve. ∆ * compares the parameters of the ECB and the Bank of England.  ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels. 
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Table 6: Market reaction to communication, mean equation 
financial market variable: sign.
3-month interest rates 0.010 *** 0.003 0.006 *** 0.002
6-month interest rates 0.005 0.003 0.011 *** 0.002
1-year interest rates 0.009 ** 0.004 0.018 *** 0.004
2-year interest rates 0.010 * 0.006 0.020 *** 0.007
5-year interest rates 0.011 * 0.007 0.022 *** 0.007
10-year interest rates 0.008 0.007 0.018 ** 0.007
20-year interest rates 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.006
equity market -0.003 *** 0.001 0.003 *** 0.001 ***
exchange rate 0.000 0.001 -0.002 *** 0.001 *
5-year inflation expectations 0.007 0.006 -0.003 0.005
financial market variable: sign.
3-month interest rates 0.005 *** 0.002 -0.003 0.002 ***
6-month interest rates 0.008 *** 0.002 -0.006 ** 0.003 ***
1-year interest rates 0.009 ** 0.004 0.000 0.004
2-year interest rates 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.008
5-year interest rates 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.007
10-year interest rates -0.002 0.006 0.010 0.008
20-year interest rates 0.000 0.006 0.002 0.007
equity market -0.003 ** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.001 ***
exchange rate 0.000 0.001 0.002 ** 0.001 **
5-year inflation expectations -0.001 0.005 -0.003 0.005
financial market variable: sign.
3-month interest rates 0.021 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 ***
6-month interest rates 0.016 *** 0.002 0.002 *** 0.000 ***
1-year interest rates 0.025 *** 0.002 0.004 *** 0.001 ***
2-year interest rates 0.025 *** 0.005 0.000 0.005 ***
5-year interest rates 0.020 *** 0.005 -0.002 0.005 ***
10-year interest rates 0.006 0.005 -0.002 0.004
20-year interest rates 0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.003 *
equity market -0.004 *** 0.001 0.002 * 0.001 ***
exchange rate -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 *
5-year inflation expectations -0.002 0.004 0.000 0.003




monetary policy economic outlook
monetary policy economic outlook
 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in italics to the right of the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at 
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Table 7: Market reaction to communication, volatility equation 
financial market variable: sign.
3-month interest rates 0.238 *** 0.021 -0.253 *** 0.037 ***
6-month interest rates 0.190 *** 0.019 -0.201 *** 0.035 ***
1-year interest rates 0.136 *** 0.026 -0.096 * 0.055 ***
2-year interest rates 0.046 *** 0.016 0.015 0.027
5-year interest rates 0.056 *** 0.018 0.013 0.030 **
10-year interest rates 0.042 * 0.021 0.050 0.033
20-year interest rates 0.001 0.017 0.046 * 0.027 **
equity market 0.084 *** 0.021 -0.099 *** 0.033 ***
exchange rate 0.003 0.020 -0.044 0.031
5-year inflation expectations 0.074 *** 0.007 0.308 *** 0.009 ***
financial market variable: sign.
3-month interest rates 0.068 *** 0.008 -0.357 *** 0.013 ***
6-month interest rates 0.218 *** 0.044 -0.213 *** 0.070 ***
1-year interest rates 0.015 0.034 -0.090 ** 0.043
2-year interest rates 0.201 *** 0.012 -0.121 *** 0.022 ***
5-year interest rates 0.015 0.022 0.059 ** 0.030
10-year interest rates -0.048 *** 0.015 0.084 *** 0.025 ***
20-year interest rates -0.029 *** 0.009 0.051 *** 0.016 ***
equity market 0.052 0.037 -0.239 *** 0.056 ***
exchange rate 0.053 *** 0.003 -0.128 *** 0.004 ***
5-year inflation expectations 0.001 0.019 0.029 0.028 *
financial market variable: sign.
3-month interest rates 0.415 *** 0.024 -0.244 *** 0.027 ***
6-month interest rates 0.154 0.151 -0.069 0.101
1-year interest rates 0.241 ** 0.120 0.322 ** 0.135
2-year interest rates 0.043 0.026 -0.013 0.032 ***
5-year interest rates -0.041 0.025 -0.086 *** 0.031 ***
10-year interest rates -0.012 ** 0.005 0.047 *** 0.006 ***
20-year interest rates -0.013 0.008 0.026 ** 0.011 ***
equity market -0.158 *** 0.022 0.076 ** 0.030 ***
exchange rate -0.050 *** 0.017 0.088 *** 0.023 ***
5-year inflation expectations 0.293 *** 0.036 -0.567 *** 0.045 ***
Bank of England
monetary policy economic outlook
Federal Reserve
monetary policy economic outlook
European Central Bank
monetary policy economic outlook
 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in italics to the right of the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at 




Working Paper Series No. 488
May 2005 
Table 8: Market reaction to communication on 
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Table 9: Market reactio
n to communication on 
economic outlook
 -- by person and t
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Figure 1.a: Communication by the Federal Reserve 
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Figure 1.b: Communication by the Bank of England 









































Notes: See text for explanation. 
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Figure 1.c: Communication by the European Central Bank 
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- 4 - 3 - 2 - 101234
 
Notes: The vertical axis indicates the fraction of days in which communication takes place. The bars 
aggregate data from four days (i.e., bar “-1” contains days 4, 3, 2 and 1 before a meeting of the decision-
making body). The first and last bars additionally contain all days beyond ±16 (for which generally less than 
10 observations are available). 
 









- 4 - 3 - 2 - 101234
 
Notes: The vertical axis indicates the fraction of days in which communication takes place. The bars 
aggregate data from three days (i.e., bar “-1” contains days 3, 2 and 1 before a meeting of the decision-making 
body). The first and last bars additionally contain all days beyond ±16 (for which generally less than 10 
observations are available). 
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- 4 - 3 - 2 - 101234
 
Notes: The vertical axis indicates the fraction of days in which communication takes place. The bars 
aggregate data from two days (i.e., bar “-1” contains days 2 and 1 before a meeting of the decision-making 
body). The first and last bars additionally contain all days beyond ±16 (for which generally less than 10 
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 
Notes: See text for definition. The dots at 0.00 indicate that there were statements in the respective inter-
meeting period and that this communication was fully consistent. 
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Notes: See text for definition. The dots at 0.00 indicate that there were statements in the respective inter-




Working Paper Series No. 488
May 2005 














1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
Notes: See text for definition. The dots at 0.00 indicate that there were statements in the respective inter-
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24 July 1999: “Greenspan rattles rates” 
“On July 24, 1999, the US Federal Reserve has warned that it may have to lift interest rates again. Appearing 
before the US House Banking Committee, Federal Reserve head Alan Greenspan stated that the US economy 
still appeared to be growing too quickly, and that the bank may need to take pre-emptive action to prevent a 
rise in inflation. […]” 
Coded: C
MP=1, no entry for economic outlook  
 
23 February 2000: “Interest rates to keep rising until demand slows, N.Y. Fed chief says” 
“The Federal Reserve will keep raising U.S. interest rates until the supercharged pace of domestic demand 
slows, New York Fed President William McDonough said Tuesday. Still, McDonough said, inflation is low 
and probably will even fall a bit. And though the Fed sees growing stock market wealth driving up demand, 
draconian monetary policy will probably not be needed to curb the wealth effect, he added. […]” 
Coded: C
MP=1, no entry for economic outlook  
 
20 April 2001: “Fed’s Ferguson says slowdown isn’t yet finished” 
“It’s still too early to see an end to the economic slowdown that has triggered a steep round of interest-rate 
cuts, Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Roger Ferguson said. A day after the Fed surprised markets with a half-
percentage-point cut in interest rates, Mr. Ferguson told the National Economists Club here that ‘it is still too 
early to have a strong conviction that the economy is reaching the end of this period of quite slow growth.’ 
[…]” 
Coded: C
EC=-1, no entry for monetary policy 
 
7 March 2002: “Greenspan says U.S. expansion ‘well under way’” 
“Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, citing encouraging signs in recent days, painted a rosier 
economic picture than just a week ago and said the U.S. expansion was ‘well under way’. In a rare and 
unexpected revision of formal testimony he delivered last week to the House of Representatives Financial 
Services Panel, Greenspan told a Senate committee: ‘The recent evidence increasingly suggests that an 
economic expansion is already well under way, although an array of influences unique to this business cycle 
seems likely to moderate its speed.’ The Fed chief, who was clearly more decided in his assessment that the 
U.S. recession had ended, added that he saw ‘encouraging’ signs in recent days that final demand was 
strengthening. […]” 
Coded: C
EC=1, no entry for monetary policy 
 
Bank of England: 
 
16 January 2001: “George ‘to cut rates if necessary’” 
The Governor of the Bank of England last night signalled he stood ready to cut interest rates if the economy 
deteriorated, but said he remained calm about the impact of an American downturn on the UK. […]” 
Coded: C
MP=-1, no entry for economic outlook  
 
19 October 2001: “BoE’s Clementi says ‘clear downside risks’ to rates” 
“Bank of England deputy governor David Clementi said on Friday there were ‘clear downside risks’ to UK 






23 October 2001: “UK MPC’s Allsopp says lower rates needed” 
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UK interest rates should be cut further to tackle a combination of a weakening global economy and a 
slowdown in UK consumer demand, a member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee was 
quoted as saying. Christopher Allsopp was quoted in Tuesday’s Independent newspaper as saying there were 
risks to inflation in the British economy but that the threat to consumer demand was stronger. ‘I think we will 
be in for a bumpy ride and would come out and say that further policy adjustments will need to be made,’ he 
said. ‘My own assessment is that there is weakness out there that would suggest lower interest rates in the 
future. The question is when.’ The paper said Allsopp highlighted mounting redundancies and trouble in 





26 November 2002: “BoE’s George, King say UK rates may have bottomed” 
“Britain’s two most senior central bankers warned that interest rates could be at their low point in the current 
cycle, with Bank of England Governor Sir Edward George even raising the spectre of a rise. Giving evidence 
to Parliament’s Treasury Select Committee, George said a hike in rates, which have been at a 38-year low of 
four percent for a year, would be necessary if consumer demand did not slow as the BoE had anticipated. He 
said the higher consumer spending rose, the greater the risk it would fall sharply. He said he was ‘not 
suggesting we are there but there is concern.’ Deputy governor Mervyn King told the committee British rates 
will probably not be cut any further if the world economy turns out as the Bank of England has forecast. 
Asked if interest rates had bottomed, King said, ‘If the world were to evolve as in our central view, that would 
probably be a reasonable view.’[…]” 
Coded: C
MP=1, no entry for economic outlook  
 
European Central Bank: 
 
1 November 1999: “Duisenberg warns of tightening” 
“Wim Duisenberg, the president of the European Central Bank, today says the ECB’s bias towards increasing 
interest rates had become slightly stronger since July. ‘I don’t know what the ECB Council will decide on 4 
November but I can imagine it,’ Mr. Duisenberg told the German business daily Handelsblatt. ‘Our tightening 
bias has slightly strengthened since July. One can definitely say that.’ Mr. Duisenberg said that the ECB 
council meeting last month had unanimously concluded the next rate move could only be upwards. […]” 
Coded: C
MP=1, no entry for economic outlook 
 
25 April 2002: “ECB’s Domingo Solans still sees euro zone recovery” 
“European Central Bank executive board member Eugenio Domingo Solans said on Thursday not too much 
should be read into the latest German Ifo business barometer and said it did not change expectations for a euro 
zone recovery this year. ‘You can’t draw hasty conclusions… The state of opinion is the same. This year will 
be a year of recovery,’ Domingo Solans told reporters after giving a lecture in Salamanca.” 
Coded: C
EC=1, no entry for monetary policy 
 
8 October 2002: “Duisenberg says rates right, Europe needs reforms” 
“ECB President Wim Duisenberg stood firm in the face of pressure to cut interest rates, saying government 
reforms and not easier monetary policy were the key to igniting growth in Europe. Duisenberg’s testimony to 
the European Parliament appeared to rule out a rate cut when the European Central Bank’s policy council 
meets on Thursday to decide on interest rates. […]” 
Coded: C
MP=0, no entry for economic outlook 
 
29 April 2004: “ECB’s Papademos says euro zone still recovering” 
“The euro zone economy is still recovering and the European Central Bank is keeping all options open on 
interest rate policy, ECB Vice President Lucas Papademos was quoted as saying. ‘All in the available 
information continues to point to a slow, moderate recovery,’ Papademos told the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung […].” 
Coded: C
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